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The central paradox of the American
economy today is that we are apparently in an
era of extremely rapid technological progress
in which economic progress has slowed dra-
matically —  and according to some measures
stopped. In an article in the Wall Street Journal
for June 8, 1995, G. Paschal Zachary quotes
Robert M. White, head of the National Acad-
emy of Engineering: “The pace and intensity of
technological advance are without historical
precedent.” By contrast, government data say
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that U.S. aggregate economic growth, after
correcting for inflation, has been very slow for
the past 20 years, compared with past trends.
The apparent consequence is that measured
economic rewards have stagnated.  In particu-
lar, current measurements show real average
hourly earnings are lower now than they were
20 years ago.  While total real earnings per per-
son (counting all residents of all ages) in the
United States have increased, it is only because
a larger proportion of us are working and be-
cause the quality of the workforce has increased:
we are better educated and more experienced
at our jobs. What these and other official statis-
tics plainly assert is that changes in the tech-
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nology of production no longer lead to im-
provements in economic well-being.
An alternative view is that the statistics are
wrong: the U.S. economy has been experienc-
ing strong growth, but our official measures fail
to reflect it.  In an article in the November/De-
cember 1995 issue of the Business Review, I ar-
gued this mismeasurement view — our price sta-
tistics are biased upward, thereby artificially
reducing measured U.S. growth.
The policy differences implied by the two
alternative economic descriptions are profound.
For better or worse, we live in a society in which
national economic policy is both formulated
and evaluated based on national statistics.
Should we stress fairness and support for the
unfortunate, or should we stress efficiency and
incentives for savings and investment?  Should
we tax all incomes equally, or should the rich
bear a disproportionate burden, even though
this reduces their incentives to earn?  A prereq-
uisite for answering these kinds of questions is
good data. If our economy is stagnating,  gen-
erosity to those currently in unfortunate circum-
stances may be misplaced because it may make
us less able to be generous in the future. On the
other hand, if the economy is growing robustly,
we may be able to afford more generous poli-
cies today.
In this article, we will explore how economic
progress is measured and some policy implica-
tions that arise from alternative measures of our
rate of growth.
ECONOMIC PROGRESS
What Is It, and How Do We Measure It?
Economic progress is best defined as the abil-
ity to better meet our needs and desires by in-
creasing the quantity and quality of goods and
services at our command. Such progress comes
from making better use of existing resources as
well as using more resources. Ideally, we would
like a measure of economic well-being that takes
into account nonmarket activities such as child
rearing and home health care. In practice, how-
ever, our statistics measure goods and services
sold in the marketplace. Thus we measure eco-
nomic progress by the growth in output of
marketed goods and services, not growth in
well-being.
1 The advantage in referring only to
the marketplace is that we can quantify market
activities by the prices paid for marketed goods
and services (and as we shall see, even that is
no easy task!). Accurate quantitative measure-
ment, in turn, provides common facts about
national problems, and such information is
important to the success of our policies to over-
come them.
For purposes of measurement, there is an
important distinction between two kinds of eco-
nomic progress: progress in our ability to make
existing  goods and services versus our ability
to create new goods and services that satisfy old
needs more efficiently.  Economists have long
expected existing goods and services to become
less important over time because, as wealth
rises, we are likely to demand more variety of
and higher quality goods: as wealth rises, ne-
cessity shrinks in importance and luxury gains.
2
In all previous eras, necessity was para-
mount. If we turn back the clock of Western
1The market-based measures used in economic analy-
sis, such as gross domestic product (GDP —  the broadest
measure of domestic output), thus clearly mismeasure
growth in well-being. In general, market-based measures
are upwardly biased measures of growth in well-being, as
nonmarket activities such as child rearing and care for eld-
erly relatives at home become market activities at daycare
centers and nursing homes. In earlier times, these types of
activities were provided within the household and ex-
tended family, not through paid market services, and so
were not counted as part of GDP. Thus, even if the amount
of these activities hasn’t changed, measured GDP has
grown, since these activities more frequently take place in
the market and thus are counted as part of GDP. This makes
the paradox of slow growth in recent years even more
marked: GDP shows little growth even though it is intrin-
sically biased in favor of showing too much growth!
2See, for example, H.L. Wold, Demand Analysis (John
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economic development 400 years, for example,
we find that in the Mediterranean world of the
Renaissance, food was by far the dominant eco-
nomic product, representing some four-fifths of
all economic output.  Of this, fully half was
bread grains, primarily wheat.
3  A Spanish or
Italian worker might have labored 140 days in
a normal year to earn the ton of wheat that
meant subsistence for his family; famine was
never far away.  A drought that doubled the
price of grain was ruinous, and such a drought
typically recurred three to six times in a
worker’s average lifetime.
The contrast with the situation facing the
American worker is substantial. Today, a ton of
wheat costs less than $150 wholesale.
4  Even at
the minimum wage of $4.75 an hour this is but
a week’s work; at the average wage of $12, it is
under two days’ work.  Creating the raw mate-
rials necessary for caloric subsistence used to
require the preponderance of the working year;
now it is a trivial part.
Americans spend more on medicine than on
food, beverages, and tobacco (a category that
includes restaurants). And the food purchased
for home consumption includes an increasing
proportion of ready-to-eat or -drink products
as the boundary between supermarkets and
take-out restaurants disappears. Thus, without
question, over these past 400 years, there has
been spectacular advance in the standard of liv-
ing enjoyed by the citizens of economically ad-
vanced Western nations like the United States.
A Slower Pace of Measured Growth.  In the
past 20 years, however, there has been a marked
slowdown in measured U.S. economic growth.
According to official statistics, real gross domes-
tic product (GDP), a measure of total market-
place economic activity that includes govern-
ment, business, and consumers, grew at an an-
nual rate of 3.8 percent from 1959 to 1974.  But
its growth then slowed by one-third, to an an-
nual rate of 2.7 percent, from 1974 to 1994.
Population growth slowed too, from 1.3 per-
cent annually to 1.0 percent annually.  So on a
per-person basis, real GDP slowed from 2.5
percent to 1.7 percent.
This slower pace of growth has been the sub-
ject of repeated analysis along the lines that
Nobel Laureate Robert Solow advanced: ana-
lyzing the sources of growth by measuring the
contributions of added capital, added labor, and
improved technology.  Solow’s original work,
published in 1957, covered the period 1909 to
1949.
5  During that time, real output in the non-
farm business sector (a convenient grouping
that avoids the measurement problems of the
agricultural and government sectors) grew at
an annual rate of 2.9 percent.
6  Of this rate, 1.1
percentage points were due to an increase in
the total number of hours worked (a product,
in turn, of more people working a shorter num-
ber of hours each year, with the increase in
workers outweighing the shortening of the
work year).  Of the remaining 1.8 percentage
points, Solow reckoned that one-fifth (0.4 per-
cent annually) was due to an increase in capital
per worker, that is, people having more equip-
ment with which to do their work. The remain-
ing four-fifths (1.4 percent annually) was due
to an increase in technological progress, that is,
3Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterra-
nean World in the Age of Phillip II, Vol. 1, Sian Reynolds,
transl. (Harper and Row, 1972), pp. 418-61.
4The cash price of wheat in December 1996 was $4 per
bushel, or roughly $135 a ton.
5Robert M. Solow, “Technical Change and the Aggre-
gate Production Function,” Review of Economics and Statis-
tics, 39 (1957), pp. 312-20.  The data on labor hours are from
Solow’s source, later published as John W. Kendrick, Pro-
ductivity Trends in the United States (Princeton University
Press,  1961).
6In agriculture, the difficulty is counting the hours of
farm owners and their families. In the government sector
the outputs — compulsory schooling, criminal justice —
are hard to count because they are not priced in the mar-
ketplace.
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having superior procedures and equipment
with which to work. Subsequent work by Ed-
ward Denison of the Brookings Institution on
the period 1929 to 1969 pushed up the annual
contribution of technology to 1.7 percent.
7  The
clearcut evidence from these and other studies
was that for most of the 20th century, most of
American economic growth per person was due
to improvements in our technology — how we
worked — rather than to increases in hours
worked or amount of capital per worker. Ex-
actly how technological advance of this type
occurs and to what extent the improvements in
technology reside in organization of the
workforce (working smarter) or equipment
(smarter tools) have remained unclear.  Indeed,
technological advance came to be known as the
“black box” of economic growth.
8
When this same approach is applied to the
period of the slowdown in growth that began
in the 1970s, however, a new, startling conclu-
sion emerges.
9  The statistics show that the
growth of labor and capital accounts for all of
the increased growth beginning in the mid-
1970s and that the contribution of technologi-
cal advance to economic growth has disap-
peared!  Figure 1 shows what is left over from
output growth after accounting for increases in
capital and labor.
10 From 1929 to 1974, our pro-
ductivity advanced at an annual rate of 1.7 per-
cent; afterwards, its growth was nearly zero.
The picture of slowdown in U.S. productiv-
ity growth in Figure 1 is at odds with the pic-
ture of intensive technological advance that
appears in business and science publications.
Let’s take just one example: electronics. Ad-
vances in integrated chips have made electron-
ics ubiquitous in the United States. The num-
ber of computers in use today rivals the num-
ber of cars. And the United States is at the fore-
front of the design, manufacture, and utiliza-
tion of integrated circuits.
Similarly, U.S. universities are at the forefront
of practically every discipline, from neuro-
science to materials science to computer science,
from comparative literature to finance to cin-
ema.  And this expertise spills over to technol-
ogy and engineering, as Intel and Microsoft,
Merck and Goldman Sachs, Disney and
McDonald’s continue to dominate world mar-
kets.
To try to reduce the dissonance between these
two portraits of America, we can look at other
aggregate evidence of American well-being.  We
have already discussed one candidate: the
analysis of expenditure on necessities and luxu-
ries.




A systematic way of testing for the presence
of economic growth is to examine the rate at
which basic economic necessities, such as food
and clothing and household operations, are
shrinking as a proportion of total expendi-
tures.
11  The basic empirical principle in this re-
gard is Engel’s Law: As real income per person
7Edward F. Denison, Accounting for United States Eco-
nomic Growth, 1929-1969 (Brookings Institution, 1974). The
1.7 percent figure represents Denison’s semiresidual, which
includes both pure technological advance and economies
of scale — productivity gains due to the increased scale of
production. Here, I am lumping the two together. It is now
generally recognized that technological advance and econo-
mies of scale are, in the long run, inseparable. Output per
person grew 2.1 percent during this period.
8See, for example, the preface to Nathan Rosenberg, In-
side the Black Box: Technology and Economics (Cambridge
University Press, 1982).
9Edward F. Denison, Accounting for Slower Economic
Growth: The United States in the 1970s (Brookings Institu-
tion, 1979).
10Bureau of Labor Statistics, Multifactor Productivity
Trends, 1994.The Livingston Survey: Still Useful After All These Years Dean Croushore
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rises, the proportion spent on food declines. The
eminent Harvard economist Hendrik
Houthakker has said, “Of all empirical regu-
larities observed in economic data, Engel’s Law
is probably the best established; indeed it holds
not only in the cross-section data where it was
first observed, but has often been confirmed in
time-series analysis as well.”
12
Table 1 illustrates the basic idea.  Suppose at
time 0 real income is 1000, of which 60 percent
is spent on food and other necessities, while the
other 40 percent is spent on luxuries.  Now sup-
pose that real income grew 20 percent, to 1200.
Demand for food doesn’t increase as much as
demand for luxuries, so although food pur-
chases increase, they shrink as a percent of ex-
penditures.  Suppose that real income grows
another 20 percent.  Food purchases continue
to rise, but less rapidly than total income and
spending. The share spent on food declines over
time. Moreover, equal percent increases in real
income lead to equal changes in shares of nomi-
nal expenditure: in both periods, each share
changes 5 percentage points.
This formulation of Engel’s Law is based on
FIGURE 1
U.S. Economic Statistics Appear to Indicate
No Technological Progress Since 1977
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Multifactor Productivity Trends, 1994.
11This section is based on my paper, “Is U.S. Economic
Performance Really That Bad?” Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia Working Paper 95-21/R, April 1996.
12Hendrik S. Houthakker, “Engel’s Law,” in John
Eatwell, Murray Milgate, and Peter Newman, eds., The New
Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics. Volume 2 (Macmillan,
1987), pp.143-44.
Is the U.S. Economy Really Growing Too Slowly?                  Leonard Nakamura6 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF PHILADELPHIA
BUSINESS REVIEW MARCH/APRIL 1997
TABLE 1
Example of Engel’s Law:
As Real Incomes Rise, the Share Spent on Necessities Falls
Year Zero Ten Twenty Change Change
0 to 10 10 to 20
Spending on food and other necessities  600  825  1080
Spending on luxuries  400  675  1080
Nominal expenditures 1000 1500 2160
Spending on food and other necessities   60%   55%  50% 5% 5%
Spending on luxuries   40%   45%  50% 5% 5%
Nominal income 1000 1500 2160
Prices 100 125 150
Real income (dollars) 1000 1200 1440 20% 20%
Note: Deaton and Muellbauer’s formulation: Equal percent changes in real incomes in two periods lead to equal
percentage point changes in shares of expenditures of necessities and luxuries.  All data per person.
work by Angus Deaton and John Muellbauer.
13
It implies that equal percent increases in real
income per person should lead to equal per-
centage point changes in shares of expenditure.
How do we apply their formulation to U.S.
data?  From 1959 to 1974, according to the offi-
cial statistics, real income per person grew 45
percent.  In the longer period from 1974 to 1994,
real income per person grew 39 percent. If these
numbers are accurate, one would expect that
the share of necessities in total expenditures
should have shrunk by about the same amount
in the two periods (or perhaps a bit less in the
second period). In fact, the proportion of the
average budget spent on food fell from 27.3
percent in 1959 to 23.1 percent in 1974, or 4.2
percentage points, but fell substantially more
— 7.1 percentage points — from 1974 to 1994.
The proportion of household budgets spent
on other necessities, such as clothing and home
heating, also almost uniformly contracted by
more in the period 1974 to 1994 than in the ear-
lier period 1959 to 1974 (Table 2). In contrast,
the share spent on luxuries, such as medical
care, personal business services, recreation, edu-
cation, and foreign travel, generally rose more
in the later period than in the earlier one.
14  This
13“An  Almost-Ideal Demand System,” American Eco-
nomic Review 70 (June 1980), pp. 312-16. Their system for-
mally says that holding relative prices constant, equal
changes in the logarithm of real income lead to equal
changes in shares in nominal expenditures. Here we dis-
cuss the system in terms of percent changes as we assume
most readers are more familiar with that terminology.
14What is a necessity and what is a luxury is not always
easy to determine. Food is the clearest example of a neces-
sity. Goods and services whose consumption declines over
long periods of time when incomes are rising are defined
as necessities here; the consumption of luxuries rises over
the same time periods.The Livingston Survey: Still Useful After All These Years Dean Croushore
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faster shift away from necessities as a propor-
tion of budgets in the second period suggests
that real income per person grew more in the
second period than in the first, not less as the
official statistics say.
How much more? To answer this question,
calculate the average absolute change in shares
for all consumption categories over each period,
that is, take the average without considering
whether each change is up or down.  In this
way, a decline of 2 percent for a necessity like
food and a rise of 2 percent for a luxury like
travel both correspond to rising real income.
The nine consumption categories in Table 2
changed absolutely by 1.50 percentage points,
on average, in the period 1959 to 1974, while
they changed 2.88 percentage points, on aver-
age, from 1974 to 1994. If we use Deaton and
Muellbauer’s application of Engel’s Law, the
fact that the average shift in spending shares
(away from necessities and toward luxuries)
was almost twice as big in the second period as
in the first — 2.88 to 1.50 percentage points —
implies that the true rise in real income in the
second period was about twice as large as that
in the first (so long as prices of luxuries did not
TABLE 2
Nominal Spending on Each Category
Share of Total Spending Change in
(in percent) Spending Shares
1959 1974 1994 1959-74 1974-94
Total 100 100 100
Food, Beverages and Tobacco 27.3 23.1 16 -4.2 -7.1
Clothing, Upkeep, and Personal Care 11.7 10.1 7.9 -1.6 -2.2
Housing 14.1 14.3 14.8 0.2 0.5
Household Furnishings, Fuel and Operation 14.1 13.2 11.1 -0.9 -2.1
Medical Care 6.4 10.0 17.5 3.6 7.5
Personal Business Services 4.3 4.9 7.6 0.6 2.7
Transportation 12.7 12.7 11.2 0 -1.5
Recreation 5.5 6.8 7.9 1.3 1.1
Education, Welfare, and
   Americans’ Foreign  Travel 3.8 4.9 6.1 1.1 1.2
Average Absolute Change in Shares
   of Consumption 1.5 2.88
Real GDP per Person, Official Measures,
   chained 1992 $ $12,494 $18,178 $25,352
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Survey of Current Business, January/February and August, 1996.  Popula-
tion data from Economic Report of the President, 1996, U.S. Government Printing Office.
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rise at a substantially different rate than prices
of necessities). If real income rose 45 percent
from 1959 to 1974 as the official data show, the
change in spending shares from 1974 to 1994
suggests that real income rose just over 100 per-
cent during those 20 years, not 39 percent as
reported in the official statistics.
15 Over 1974 to
1994, this represents a per-person annual
growth rate of 3.7 percent, not 1.7 percent —  a
difference of 2.0 percentage points per year.
Now let’s reexamine the productivity slow-
down that began around the mid-1970s. That
slowdown is reflected in the official data in
Table 2 in that more real growth per person took
place from 1959 to 1974 than in the longer pe-
riod from 1974 to 1994. But the slowdown is
not consistent with the changes in the consump-
tion expenditure shares. The implication of the
calculations reported above is that growth in
real income per person was mismeasured by
2.0 percentage points annually from 1974 to
1994 — slightly more than the measured slow-
down in productivity growth in the official sta-
tistics of 1.7 percentage points annually. That
is, it is possible that the entire productivity slow-
down of the past two decades revealed by the
official statistics is the result of
mismeasurement!  Put another way, the shifts
in composition of expenditures from 1959 to
1974 and from 1974 to 1994 are consistent with
the view that productivity growth was the same
in both periods. Households are spending in a
pattern that is inconsistent with the official sta-
tistics on real output and price; that is, the av-
erage household has expanded the proportion
of luxuries it buys as if its real income had
doubled over the last 20 years, while the offi-
cial data report that its real income rose by less
than half.
INCREASING UNCERTAINTY IN
OUTPUT MEASUREMENT IN THE
AMERICAN ECONOMY
Is it really possible that growth could be
mismeasured on this scale? Quantifying eco-
nomic progress was easier in earlier periods in
the industrial revolution. Mass production stan-
dardized many goods and thus made their out-
put easier to measure. The more uniform qual-
ity of apples and wheat and cars and shoes
made for standardized pricing and publication
of wholesale and retail prices of these commodi-
ties. The most rapid progress took place in the
production of goods whose increased quanti-
ties we were best able to measure.
Now, an increasing proportion of the
economy is devoted to products whose real
output we do not attempt to measure. As Zvi
Griliches pointed out in his 1993 presidential
address to the American Economic Association,
the industrial composition of the economy has
shifted to service activities that we are not well
prepared to measure.
16  And an increasing pro-
portion of goods we do measure is changing
more rapidly than in the past, adding to the
measurement difficulties.
The clearest example lies in two major com-
ponents of current consumption expenditures,
medical care and personal business services,
which are predominately measured by inputs
rather than by outputs. Our official data esti-
mate the output of doctors or insurance agents
by the number of hours doctors and insurance
agents work, rather than the success rate of
treatment or number of insurance policies writ-
ten.
17,18  That is, our statistics assume produc-
15To see this, remember that the underlying arithmetic
is being done in logs. The change in the log of real income
from 1959 to 1974 is 0.375. We multiply this by the ratio
between the percent changes, 0.375 x (2.88/1.50) = 0.720.
The antilog of .720 is 2.05, suggesting that real per capita
income in 1994 was 2.05 times real per capita income in
1974.
16Zvi Griliches, “Productivity, R&D, and the Data Con-
straint,” American Economic Review 84 (March, 1994), pp. 1-
23.The Livingston Survey: Still Useful After All These Years Dean Croushore
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tivity growth in these areas is nonexistent. And
these two categories of consumption alone have
grown from about 11 percent of consumption
expenses in 1959 to over 25 percent of consump-
tion expenses in 1994, so the errors in measure-





We thus are confronted by two possibilities:
One, our true economic performance has been
quite good, but our measurement of that per-
formance has been faulty. Two, our measures
are right, and scientific and technological
progress is not being translated into increased
economic output. Is this difference important?
The data matter because political disagree-
ments about what our problems are and how
to fix them rest on statistics, as does our ability
to evaluate the success or failure of our efforts
to solve them.  Programs that leave in their
wake high inflation and low growth are clearly
failures, while those that result in low inflation
and high growth are successes.  If the rate of
increase in prices is overestimated, so that
growth in output is understated, an economic
policy that, in fact, has successfully generated
high growth and low inflation will appear to
be a failure that has generated low growth and
high inflation.
Here are some examples that show why
knowing the correct measures of growth is criti-
cal to our understanding of the economy. Two
other examples are discussed in Output
Mismeasurement in Health and Educational Ser-
vices.
Fostering Growth. If we accept the official
data at face value and productivity  is stagnat-
ing, future generations may be worse off. To be
generous to those future generations, we may
need to decrease constraints on economic
growth and increase incentives to economic ef-
ficiency, even at the expense of equity in the
present. Milton Friedman has argued that gov-
ernment regulations increased dramatically in
the 1970s under Presidents Nixon and Carter,
declined under President Reagan, and then re-
bounded to a new high under Presidents Bush
and Clinton (Figure 2). If these regulations are
associated with programs that have benefited
the aged (for example, Medicare and Social Se-
curity) and the unfortunate (for example, the
Americans with Disabilities Act and Medicaid)
at the expense of economic efficiency, perhaps
this generosity was misplaced, for, according
to the official statistics, our ability to produce
with fixed resources is on the verge of deterio-
ration.
Another way to foster growth is to reduce
government claims on resources, permitting
greater private incentives. A sharp decline in
government purchases and cutbacks in the fed-
eral safety net are already in progress.
On the other hand, if real output and infla-
tion have been mismeasured, the apparent fail-
ure of current policies may be an artifact of bad
statistics. Has free trade in the United States
been costly? The apparent slow growth of the
U.S. economy in the 1980s and 1990s has led
some critics to argue that policies too generous
to our trading partners have put us on a per-
manently slower growth path. But are we re-
ally on a slower growth path?
17Technically, the Bureau of Economic Analysis deflates
the nominal revenues of these service providers by a
weighted average of input prices. To the extent that any
increase in productivity results in higher wages, it will not
be measured as increased real output.
18The Bureau of Economic Analysis has recently
changed the method it uses for deflating medical services.
It now uses the Producer Price Index (PPI) for medical ser-
vices, a series first collected in late 1992, to deflate that seg-
ment of personal consumption expenditures. This series
measures the costs of treating a disease, a procedure that
should be substantially closer to the right measure. How-
ever, this measure does not take into consideration improve-
ments in quality of outcomes.
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To take another example, part of the sense of
crisis about the U.S. economy is a fear that the
Social Security system will be unable to sup-
port a rising burden of retirees. Part of this fear
may be due to the fact that once a retiree enters
the Social Security pool, payments rise with the
Consumer Price Index. In theory, this permits
retirees to keep up with inflation. But if the
Consumer Price Index is overstated, as the
Boskin Commission has argued, retirees are
enjoying rising real incomes. Indeed, average
Social Security benefits have been rising faster
than wages — virtually guaranteeing long-run
instability.
Are We Saving and Investing Too Little?
U.S. national income accounts are set up to mea-
sure investment in goods — plant and equip-
ment — but not in information: research, edu-
 Output Mismeasurement in Health and
Educational Services
Measurement problems also apply to policy issues within specific industries, such as health and edu-
cation. Our efforts in these areas may suffer because we confuse inflation and technical progress.
Health Care in Crisis. We are experiencing a national crisis over health care expenses. This is no
wonder: medical care now counts for one-sixth of our consumption. But because we do not measure
the output of doctors, nurses, or pharmacists, but rather inputs, some people have the impression
that medical providers are absorbing an increasing part of American income out of pure avarice. But
what economic evidence there is suggests instead that medical costs are rising entirely because of
technological advance — improvements in medical practices cause us to want to buy a lot more medi-
cal care.*
As surgery has become less invasive and recoveries more rapid and as the probability of success
has risen, patients and doctors have chosen surgical intervention more often. Far more heart attack
victims now choose to undergo bypasses and angioplasties because the survival rates are higher and
recoveries quicker. Knee surgeries have proliferated as arthroscopic procedures have shortened re-
covery times to days rather than months. New, expensive drug combinations now offer hope to AIDS
victims, when before their cases had been considered hopeless. Thus, the improvement in medical
practices has widened demand and, in Cutler’s analysis, is the main force that has driven the expan-
sion of medical care.
The Rising Cost of College. A similar issue has been raised about education.  Tuition costs at private
colleges and universities, for example, have risen more rapidly than the price of medical care. Again,
the increased value of the education is not being measured.  Unquestionably, the totality of academic
information has expanded substantially, as fundamental advances have been made in every physical
and social science. As colleges and universities have more to teach, the value of education has risen.
This value may be hard to measure precisely, but all available evidence suggests that the rate of return
to a college education is increasing rather than falling.
Both of these cases are American success stories in which the producers are at the vanguard of
worldwide scientific and technological achievement. But because our statistics treat these achieve-
ments as raising prices rather than increasing output, we risk mistaking our achievements and in-
stead seek “reform” of health care and education.
*David Cutler, “Technology, Health Costs, and the NIH,” Harvard, mimeo (September  1995).The Livingston Survey: Still Useful After All These Years Dean Croushore
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cation, computer software, data, and on-the-job
experience. American investment in formal re-
search and development efforts amounted to
$169 billion in 1994, and public and private ex-
penditures on formal education (not counting
the value of the time invested by students in
acquiring education) were $508 billion in 1994.
These expenditures are roughly the same size
as our investments in business structures ($180
billion in 1994) and equipment ($487 billion in
1994). Our gross investment rate is far larger
than official data show if we consider these in-
formational expenditures to be investments
rather than costs of doing business (as our sta-
tistics currently treat research and develop-
ment) or consumption expenditures (as they
treat education).
19 Moreover, at an individual
level, categorizing our expenditures on educa-
tion as investments rather than consumption
would, by lowering measured consumption,
boost savings rates as well, since savings is the
difference between consumption and income.
Measured personal savings in 1994 was less
than $200 billion, so that counting these addi-
tional investments in human capital as saving
could make a substantial difference.  Perhaps
we are already saving and investing at unusu-
ally high rates!  And fostering further saving
and investment may not be so crucial after all.
This raises another paradox, however, be-
cause if we raise our estimates of capital stock,
our estimates of total factor productivity would
worsen.  With more measured capital, the dia-
gram in Figure 1 would show a clear long-term
decline in our technological level.  Only if real
output growth is shown to be understated can
we sensibly argue that investment is under-
stated.
A more difficult, although related, problem
is the spreading inequality of incomes. In par-
ticular, college-educated workers are increas-
ingly better paid than the less well educated.
20
This disparity is likely related to the rate of tech-
nological advance: those who have college edu-
cations are better equipped to learn the addi-
19In 1994, these information investments were about
equal to investment in plant and equipment; in 1959, they
were 78 percent as large as investment in plant and equip-
ment and in 1974, 86 percent.
20Lawrence F. Katz and Kevin M. Murphy investigate
the changing supply and demand of college-educated
workers in “Changes in Relative Wages, 1963 -1987: Sup-
ply and Demand Factors,” Quarterly Journal of Economics
CVII February 1992, pp. 35-78. They find that demand for
college-educated workers has been steadily rising, but sup-
ply has fluctuated, exceeding demand in the 1970s but fall-
ing behind in the 1980s.
FIGURE 2
More Rules, Less Growth?
Note: Decadal rate of real growth of U.S. national
income, and annual number of pages in Federal Reg-
ister, 1946-93
Source: Data courtesy of Milton Friedman. These
data appeared in an article written by Dr. Friedman
for the Wall Street Journal, August 1, 1995.
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tional skills necessary to keep up with a rap-
idly changing workplace. College graduates, for
example, are far more likely than high school
graduates to participate in continuing educa-
tion courses in a given year (52 percent com-
pared with 22 percent).
21  Rapid technological
advance and increased economic efficiency may
directly exacerbate this inequality, for example,
by increasing the return to education. Thus, re-
ducing subsidies to students or spending on
education may exacerbate future problems of
inequality and deprive future generations
rather than help them. It may also be inefficient
to shift resources away from high-return invest-
ments in education to low-return investments
in physical capital.
If we believe the economy is performing
poorly, we may try to reduce educational sub-
sidies because we believe that we cannot afford
them.  Doing so may reduce efficiency and eq-
uity if our belief is incorrect.
THE IMPORTANCE
OF STATISTICAL INFORMATION
While the fact of statistical mismeasurement
may be clear, estimates of the size of statistical
mismeasurement differ widely. Estimating
these statistics more precisely is crucial to our
nation’s ability to make effective policy.  They
21Data are for 1990-91 and are taken from U.S. Bureau
of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1995
(Bernan, 1995), p. 194, which cites the U.S. National Center
for Education Statistics, Adult Education Profile for 1990-91.
provide the yardsticks by which we measure
our treatment of the poor, the rich, the elderly,
the infirm, and students.
It is widely recognized that the official data
underestimate growth and productivity.
22  But
the size of the error is unknown.  We need fur-
ther studies, detailed experimental series, and
new means of collecting data to obtain better
estimates of economic progress.  The results of
these studies would progressively be incorpo-
rated in our data series as the economy evolves.
To improve statistical measurements in the
short run and possibly even in the long run,
our statistical agencies would need more re-
sources; the experimental collection of informa-
tion aimed at improving our official statistics is
expensive both in terms of economic expertise
and electronic hardware and software.  While
it is true that electronics can improve the effi-
ciency of data collection, the rapid rate of
change in the economy means that properly
collecting the data will become more and more
difficult and will require increasing the amount
of intellectual analysis that goes into data col-
lection. But if our statistics are unable to keep
up with new economic realities, it will be ex-
tremely difficult for government policies to be
farsighted.
22For example, W. Erwin Diewert, “Comment on CPI
Biases,” Business Economics (April 1996), and Matthew D.
Shapiro and David W. Wilcox, “Causes and Consequences
of Imperfections in the Consumer Price Index,” NBER
Working Paper No. 5590, May 1996.